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Abstract. In wireless LANs, the robust security network , or RSN,
as defined in the IEEE wireless LAN security amendment, IEEE802.11i,
is the goal for any new deployment of all but the most open public net-
works. This paper discusses and compares the differences between theory
and practice — between WEP, WPA, WPA2, IEEE802.11i, RSN and
TSN — and their application in public, private, commercial and govern-
ment environments. While the details and analysis of a series of tests on
two modes of attack on WPA2 WLANs shows a possible implementa-
tion attack on a strong configuration fails for all equipment surveyed, it
illustrates the issues of weak configurations of WPA2 WLANs not meet-
ing RSN requirements and demonstrates the vulnerabilities of such weak
configurations. The empirical results are discussed, both in the context of
the relevant parts of the standard, as well as in that of the intended ap-
plication. The use of vendor-specific “mixed-modes” of operation (WEP
with WPA/WPA2), where available, is shown to severely compromise
the security of a WLAN and common failures in consumer and SOHO
configurations are also substantiated. The paper concludes with specific
guidance in the secure deployment of WPA2 to form a RSN and remedial
actions where the existing configuration degrades security.
1 Introduction
The term Wi-Fi specifically refers to technology certified to be interopera-
ble between vendors by the industry-based Wireless Fidelity Alliance, com-
monly referred to as the ‘Wi-Fi Alliance’. Wi-Fi certified equipment implements
the IEEE1 802.11 wireless LAN (WLAN) standard and is typically used in in-
frastructure WLANs, consisting of wireless stations (STA) communicating via
an access point (AP), which may also provide bridging to wired infrastructure.
This standard’s original confidentiality protocol, ‘wired equivalent privacy ’
(WEP), was plagued with security issues [1–5] in relation to the actual imple-
mentation of the encryption algorithm, the key lengths, poor key management,
authentication and message integrity. Implementations used various workarounds
to improve security, mostly involving higher-layer encryption and authentication,
including some vendor-specific solutions.
1 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
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The IEEE802.11 Task Group I (TGi) developed an amendment to the stan-
dard, IEEE802.11i [6], providing medium access control (MAC) security en-
hancements, including the robust security network (RSN). However, this
development took over three years to eventuate, during which time the Wi-
Fi Alliance, urgently needing to replace WEP, used a draft IEEE802.11i/D3
to apply part of the developing standard as its Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
certification, in order to address the most severe problems with WEP. When
IEEE802.11i was finally ratified, the Wi-Fi Alliance announced its Wi-Fi Pro-
tected Access 2 (WPA2 ) certification for the interoperability of vendor equip-
ment implementing the mandatory elements of IEEE802.11i.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the majority of consumers are not able to
differentiate between the standard, IEEE802.11i, the robust security network it
defines, and the industry interoperability certification, WPA2. Most assume all
three terms are synonymous, or else, confuse the components of the standard
with their implementation in vendor equipment.
For example, the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) is one of the two
defined RSNA data confidentiality and integrity protocols in the amendment to
the standard. As such, its use, in itself, does not preclude a RSN. However, in
practice, selecting TKIP in WPA2 certified equipment often also invokes WPA
compatibility to allow connections with WPA certified equipment, which can
only use TKIP or WEP and do not implement all of the mandatory elements of
IEEE802.11i — and so this is not a RSN.
The community at large is struggling to come to grips with WLAN security,
the pros and cons of WEP and the Wi-Fi Alliance certifications, WPA and
WPA2, along with the characteristics of the robust security network association
(RSNA), robust security network (RSN) and transition security network (TSN).
1.1 Purpose and Goals
The purpose of this paper is to present the results of research into the security of
particular configurations of wireless networks and to bring the issues of insecure
WPA and WPA2 configurations to the fore, in particular, WLAN security in
consumer-grade hardware and its application in private, SOHO, commercial and,
where applicable, government environments. This paper shall:
– discuss the differences in theory between WPA, WPA2, IEEE802.11i, RSN
and TSN, raising security issues with implementations and configurations;
– put theory into practice and empirically test these security issues in partic-
ular WPA and WPA2 configurations;
– use the results of this empirical data to draw conclusions as to the relative
risk of these configurations; and finally
– taking the above into account, provide guidance on configuring WPA2 equip-
ment to provide a RSN, including guidance on conformance with the Aus-
tralian Government Information and Communications Technology Security
Manual (ACSI2 33) [7].
2 The ACSI acronym is derived from the document’s former life as an “Australian
Communications Security Instruction”.
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1.2 Layout
The next section provides a brief overview of WLAN security. It discusses the
IEEE802.11i Amendment, emphasising the concepts of a RSNA and comparing
the function of RSNA-capable and RSNA-enabled equipment to that of pre-
RSNA equipment. The Wi-Fi Alliance’s WPA and WPA2 certifications are out-
lined, along with what these certifications provide to consumers, as well as the
various features that vendors add to aid in the creation of TSNs.
Section 3 details the results of tests conducted on ‘consumer-level’ Wi-Fi
certified WPA and WPA2 equipment to determine the realisable levels of risk
associated with various configurations of this equipment.
Section 4 discusses the implications of these results and provides guidelines
for using WPA2 to implement a RSN, with reference to the requirements of ACSI
33, as well as common configuration issues and appropriate remedial actions.
2 WLAN Security
The past four years have seen some dramatic leaps in WLAN security. With the
original insecurities of WLANs being well known and easily exploited [2–4,8–10],
both industry and standards have moved to respond to the issues. This section
gives an overview WLAN security issues and tools leading up to the release of
IEEE802.11i.
2.1 Inherent Characteristics
IEEE802.11 WLANs are inherently a broadcast technology, with the signal pass-
ing to or from any station, friend or foe, capable of receiving or transmitting it.
This is virtually inescapable in day-to-day use, without the adjunct of special
purpose buildings or environments to gaol electromagnetic emissions.
These characteristics jeopardise confidentiality by providing information,
not only in the content of the signal, the data in the message body and the
identity information in the message headers, but in the signal itself, its strength
and location.
The characteristics of the medium make WLANs highly susceptible to attacks
on the availability of the services (DoS attacks), through either directional or
omnidirectional jamming of the medium itself, or any one particular channel
thereof [11], or the easy directional or omnidirectional insertion of unprotected,
unauthenticated management frames [12] to deauthenticate or disassociate a
STA from its controlling AP. These latter attacks can be used in isolation or as
the initial part of a more sophisticated attack to interrupt communications as a
prelude to various masquerading attacks.
The lack of inherent confidentiality and weak protection of availability, cou-
pled with the intrinsic ability for easy injection of traffic into the medium by any
STA, anywhere, with sufficient transmitting power and appropriate antennae,
also threatens WLAN information integrity. Hostile STAs may masquerade as
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legitimate STAs to an AP or as the legitimate AP to an unsuspecting STA or
even both at the same time as a man-in-the-middle, completely controlling the
communications between the legitimate STA and AP.
2.2 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
To counter these inherent issues, the original IEEE802.11 WLAN standards [13,
14] provide WEP in an attempt to provide a similar level of confidentiality
to that of an unencrypted wired network. That is, ‘equivalent’ to a level of
confidentiality where stations that have been connected to a wired network can
receive (cf. decrypt) all messages for all stations on the same segment (cf. same
WEP-key), but stations not actually connected to the wired network (cf. no
WEP-key) can not receive (cf. not decrypt) any messages.
Unfortunately, WEP was quickly shown to have a number of shortcomings,
which led to WEP being broken, then patched-up by vendors and then thor-
oughly and irreparably broken again.
The first killer for WEP was its very short 40 bit key. WEP started out
as a 64-bit RC4 implementation with only 40 bits of secret key and a 24-bit
cleartext-transmitted initialisation vector (IV) — the so-called WEP-40. Many
vendors soon offered longer keys — a 128-bit version (104 bits of secret key and
the 24-bit IV, called variously WEP-104 or WEP-128, as well as some 256-bit
versions (228-bit key and 24-bit IV). However, as keys had to be manually loaded
into each STA, rotation was rare and keys remained static. This, combined with
the small IV resulted in a high probability of the key stream being repeated,
breaking the encryption.
Besides the problems with the key space, the actual implementation of the
RC4 cipher contained various weaknesses in relation to the key scheduling and
the use of “weak” IVs, as described by Scott Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin and Adi
Shamir [1] and Adam Stubblefield, John Ioannidis and Aviel D. Rubin [2], which
were quickly implemented in tools like AirSnort that require approximately 5-
10 million encrypted packets to be gathered and can then guess the encryption
password in under a second [15]. Vendors soon modified the implementations of
WEP to stop these weak IVs being used and gave WEP a little more life, while
the wireless community developed replacement technologies.
This all came tumbling down in August 2004, when “KoreK” released a
statistical cryptanalysis attack on WEP [4]. The KoreK attacks do not require
millions of packets or weak IVs, just lots of unique IVs to do the statistical
analysis. So the attack can succeed with only hundreds of thousands of packets
captured, even if no weak IVs are present. This attack was incorporated into a
number of new tools, including aircrack [16] and WepLab [17] and was the
final nail in the coffin for WEP.
WEP is completely broken and cannot secure WLANs.
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2.3 The IEEE802.11i Amendment for MAC Security
IEEE802.11i resolved all of the problems with WEP and the confidentiality
and integrity (including authentication) of all data frames. However, manage-
ment frames remain unprotected and DoS attacks on the availability of the
services still exist, along with some new DoS attacks specific to new elements in
IEEE802.11i [12].
IEEE802.11i employs IEEE802.1X to provide the authentication and it spec-
ifies key management algorithms and two data encapsulation mechanisms. The
preferred method uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in counter
(CTR) mode with cipher block chaining (CBC) with message authentication
code (MAC) — (CCM) — Protocol (CCMP). There is also the optional Tem-
poral Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) that uses the RC4 algorithm available in
WEP legacy hardware.
2.4 RSN and RSNA
IEEE802.11i introduces the robust security network (RSN) — “A security
network that allows only the creation of robust security network associa-
tions (RSNAs)” [6, Definitions 3.106], being associations “if the procedure to
establish authentication or association between them includes the 4-Way Hand-
shake” [6, Definitions 3.107] — the 4-way authentication exchange defined in
this amendment to the standard. These are two critical definitions.
2.5 RSNA Requirements
IEEE802.11i is not a standard in itself. It is an amendment to the IEEE802.11
standard. As such, it does not have its own Protocol Implementation Confor-
mance Statement (PICS), although it does amend the IEEE802.11 PICS. These
amendments make RSNA optional, but, if implemented, then implementation
of the RSN Information Element (IE) and CCMP is mandatory.
That is not to say that CCMP must be used, but it must be implemented
“in all IEEE802.11 devices claiming RSNA compliance” [6, section 8.3.1]. It is
important to note that a RSN does not, by definition, specify any particular
encryption algorithm, but depends solely on the associations it allows.
A RSN only allows RSNAs. RSNAs can use either TKIP or CCMP, along
with RSNA establishment, termination and key management procedures. To
draw the distinction clearly, a network that only has RSNAs is not necessarily
a RSN, because it may still allow pre-robust security network associations (pre-
RSNAs).
The other mandatory element is the RSN IE. It includes the list of available
pairwise (unicast) ciphers and the single groupwise (multicast/broadcast) cipher.
The pairwise cipher is used for communication only between the two parties of a
single association, while the groupwise cipher is used for multicast or broadcast
communications with many or all associated parties. That is, a unique pairwise
cipher and key is used between the AP and each STA, while the groupwise cipher
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and key is used for broadcasts from the AP to all STA. An AP in a RSN must
include this RSN IE in its Beacon and Probe Response frames and any STA
wanting to participate in a RSNA must include the RSN IE in its Association
Request frames.
2.6 RSN and TSN
Thus, a RSN only allows RSNAs; and any STA in a RSNA must implement
CCMP, may optionally implement TKIP, and can use either (if implemented)
TKIP or CCMP. But for a network to be a RSN it must not allow Pre-RSNAs.
So an AP in a RSN must not associate with pre-RSNA STAs — STAs that do
not have the RSN IE in the Association Request — and it must include the RSN
IE in its Beacon frames, showing the group cipher suite as CCMP or TKIP, but
not WEP.
A network that allows the creation of pre-RSNAs is not a RSN. A network
that allows the creation of pre-RSNAs as well as RSNAs is called a transition
security network (TSN) and can be identified by the RSN IE of Beacon
frames showing that the group cipher suite is WEP [6]. Figure 1 compares the
functionality of RSNs and TSNs within the WLAN environment. In a TSN, a
RSN STA shall include the RSN IE in its Association Requests. In an infrastruc-
ture network, as all associations are with the AP, both a TSN and RSN require
a RSNA-capable AP. A RSNA-capable AP configured to operate in a TSN must
include the RSN IE in its Beacons and can associate with both RSNA and pre-
RSNA STAs. Pre-RSNA STAs will ignore the unknown RSN IE from the AP
and will not have a RSN IE in their requests.
Fig. 1. RSNs and TSNs within the WLAN Environment
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When an AP in a TSN receives an Association Request without an RSN
IE, its IEEE802.1X Controlled Port shall initially be blocked. The IEEE802.1X
Station Management Entity unblocks the IEEE802.1X Controlled Port when
WEP has been enabled [6]. In this case, a STA using WEP can have the same
network access as a STA using a RSNA, thus bringing the security for the entire
network down to the level of simple WEP protection. Mixed modes involving
WEP offer very poor protection. In these cases, additional measures, such as
separate ‘via-WEP’ subnets, separate WEP APs (or separate SSIDs within an
AP) or other network access control should be employed.
The possible cipher suite combinations in the RSN IE are shown here:
Pairwise Groupwise
CCMP CCMP (RSN)
CCMP TKIP (RSN)
CCMP, TKIP TKIP (RSN)
TKIP TKIP (RSN)
CCMP WEP-40 or WEP-104 (TSN)
CCMP, TKIP WEP-40 or WEP-104 (TSN)
TKIP WEP-40 or WEP-104 (TSN)
UseGroup WEP-40 or WEP-104 (TSN)
The combination of TKIP as the pairwise cipher and CCMP as the group
cipher is not permitted. An AP can “Use group cipher suite” for the pairwise
cipher suite if it does not support any pairwise cipher suites.
2.7 Wi-Fi Protected Access
With the problems of WEP apparent to all, the Wi-Fi Alliance could not wait for
the final version of IEEE802.11i to be ratified. Based on a snapshot of the draft
IEEE802.11i/D3, it released WPA, which addressed the WEP vulnerabilities in
the original IEEE802.11 implementation and provided an immediate solution
for WLANs operating in infrastructure mode. WPA is not available in ad hoc
mode.
Having evolved from a TGi draft, WPA raises ambiguities in comparison
to the final IEEE802.11i release. In TKIP-Only Mode, it uses TKIP for both
the pairwise and groupwise suites and so IEEE802.11i’s definition for a RSN —
“A RSN can be identified by the indication in the RSN IE of Beacon frames
that the group cipher suite specified is not wired equivalent privacy (WEP).” [6,
Definitions 3.106] — implies that WPA supports a RSN. However, it is clear
from the minutes of the meetings of TGi that this is not the case. WPA only
implements a subset of a RSN. It does not implement the mandatory CCMP [6,
Annex A PICS PC34.1.2.1] (or Ad Hoc networks or support for Quality of Service
(QoS) with a dedicated place in the header of a RSN packet or support for pre-
authentication), thus is pre-RNSA. It forms, by definition, a TSN.
Wi-Fi certified WPA devices are not intended to service a mixture of WEP
and WPA. The Wi-Fi WPA certification demands that the default configuration
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not support this. However some vendors offer this sort of functionality ‘on top
of’ WPA certification, e.g. Cisco Aironet APs allow a “WPA Migration Mode”
where both WPA and WEP STAs concurrently associate to the same AP. This
mode of operation clearly forms a TSN. SMC offer this functionality on their
SMC2804WBR ‘Barricade g’ wireless router.
Devices certified for WPA Personal Mode offer only pre-shared key (PSK)
authentication, requiring manual configuration of a pre-shared key on the access
point and clients. No authentication server is used. Whereas, devices certified for
WPA Enterprise Mode offer both PSK and IEEE802.1X/EAP authentication.
When IEEE 802.1X is used, an authentication server (AS) (typically using the
RADIUS protocol) is required.
2.8 WPA2
WPA2 is the Wi-Fi Alliance certification of an implementation of IEEE802.11i.
WPA2 has all of the mandatory requirements of IEEE 802.11i but it differs to
provide backward compatibility with WPA. All Wi-Fi certified WPA2 devices
are interoperable with Wi-Fi certified WPA devices. WPA2 provides both TKIP
(using RC4) and CCMP (using AES) and is available in both infrastructure
mode and ad hoc mode.
Fig. 2. Differing requirements for RSN, TSN, WPA and WPA2
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2.9 When ‘WPA2’ implements a TSN
The difference between IEEE802.11i and WPA2 is small but non-trivial. Al-
though IEEE802.11i states a RSN can optionally implement and use TKIP as
well as the mandatory CCMP, when a WPA2 device is configured to allow TKIP
as well as CCMP, it often implements TKIP in the same manner as the WPA
certification and runs a mixed IEEE802.11i and WPA network — a TSN. The
implementation of this mixed WPA/WPA2 mode is mandatory for Wi-Fi WPA2
certification and so is available on all WPA2 certified devices. This is becom-
ing less of an issue, as vendors increasingly offer separate configuration options
to allow TKIP for WPA2, separate to support for ‘WPA-compatibility’ — at
least on their commercial-grade equipment. Consumer-grade equipment often
still combines the two as a single option.
The Wi-Fi Alliance’s WPA2 certification, like WPA, checks that, in the
default configuration , devices in WPA2 mode do not support WEP devices
at the same time. However, every Wi-Fi certified device must support WEP, as
it is a base interoperability requirement for Wi-Fi certification. Many vendors
offer modes that permit a mixture of WPA2 and WPA or WPA and WEP or
even all three at once, then these devices can still be WPA2 certified but in these
other modes will form a TSN. Figure 2 illustrates the differences between RSN,
TSN, WPA and WPA2.
Thus, the only WPA2 mode that supports a RSN is the so-called “WPA2-
Only Mode”. Any other mode that permits both RSNAs and pre-RSNAs will
form a TSN. TheWi-Fi WPA2 certification requires “WPA/WPA2Mixed Mode”
to be implemented. In WPA/WPA2 Mixed Mode, the AP provides both CCMP
and TKIP for the pairwise ciphers and uses TKIP as the group cipher suite to
allow both WPA and WPA2 STAs to associate on the same SSID.
Joseph Davies on Microsoft’s TechNet offers “WPA2-certified wireless equip-
ment is also compatible withWPA andWEP. You can have a mixture [of] WPA2,
WPA, and WEP wireless devices operating in the same environment [18]”. Such
a configuration is clearly a TSN.
Netgear Wi-Fi certified APs can also support both WEP and WPA/WPA2
clients at the same time, to support the transition of WEP-based wireless net-
works to WPA/WPA2. Again, this is a TSN.
Any configuration involving RSNAs (i.e. WPA2) and permitting pre-RSNAs
(WPA or WEP) is a TSN — irrespective of whether or not and pre-RSNA
equipment is actually present or associated with the network. If pre-RSNAs are
permitted then it is a TSN. This is important because it does not matter if all
the devices are using AES-CCMP, if the AP will allow a pre-RSNA association,
then the security may be compromised.
The significant risk here is where an organisation has been using a mixed-
mode WLAN, and converting all devices to use AES-CCMP, erroneously believes
the WLAN is a RSN, when there are still APs that would accept a pre-RSNA.
If an infrequently-used device were to be powered up and associate with WEP,
within minutes an attacker could determine the WEP key and gain access to the
network.
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3 Attacking WPA2 Devices
The are numerous WPA2-certified devices that are known to permit simultane-
ous WEP and WPA/WPA2 associations, when configured to do so. It is sim-
ilarly well known that the majority of commercial-grade equipment is highly-
configurable and can be made to accommodate almost anything the administra-
tor desires.
However, there seems to be no empirical data available as to the possibility of
common-off-the-shelf devices, such as might be used in small office / home office
(SOHO) situations (the consumer-grade devices), allowing simultaneous WEP
and WPA2 associations, when configured as “WPA2”, presumably intending
‘WPA2-only’ associations.
Tests were performed on a number of combinations of vendors’ devices, with
various chipsets.
3.1 Test Environment
Access Points used were:
– Linksys WRT54G “Wireless-G Broadband Router”, Wi-Fi Certified “includes
WPA2” (as opposed to the Wi-Fi WPA/WPA2 Certifications);
– Belkin “Wireless G Router”, Wi-Fi Certified and “WPA – WPA2” (but without
the Wi-Fi WPA/WPA2 Certification mark); and
– SMC SMC2804WBR “Barricade g Wireless Broadband Router”, with no Wi-Fi
certifications, claiming “Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)”, but only providing WEP
out-of-the-box, with WPA added by a flash upgrade.
Client Stations used were:
– D-Link “AirPlus G” DWL-G520 Wireless PCI Adapter (Atheros chipset) on
MicrosoftWindows 2000 Professional with D-Link “AirPlus G” DWL-G520 Win-
dows 2000 drivers;
– D-Link “AirPlus G” DWL-G520 Wireless PCI Adapter (Atheros chipset) on
Fedora with madwifi drivers and wpa supplicant;
– D-Link “AirPlus G+” DWL-G520+ Wireless PCI Adapter (Texas Instruments
ACX110 chipset) on Microsoft Windows XP Professional with D-Link “AirPlus
G+” DWL-G520+ Windows XP drivers; and
– D-Link “AirPlus G+” DWL-G520+ Wireless PCI Adapter (Texas Instruments
ACX110 chipset) on Fedora with ndiswrapper and D-Link “AirPlus G+” DWL-
G520+ Windows XP drivers.
All data capture was performed on a separate machine with a D-Link “AirPlus
G” DWL-G650 Wireless PCMCIA Adapter (Atheros chipset) on Fedora with
madwifi drivers, kismet and ethereal3.
3 The Ethereal Project now uses the name “Wireshark”.
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3.2 Initial Tests
The initial tests were performed with the Microsoft Windows clients to the
LinksysWRT54G on a “LinksysSecurityTests” network. The WRT54G allowed
the selection of WPA2 with AES or TKIP+AES or WPA with AES or TKIP or
WEP, with all possible combinations of authentication and key-modes. The Win-
dows clients offered a simplified range of options with WPA2, WPA2-Personal,
WPA, WPA-Personal and various WEP flavours.
All legal combinations of authentication and encryption were tested and the
clients were able to connect for all matching combinations and, as required and
expected, mixed encryption modes could not connect. These typically were indi-
cated by the client STA finding no suitable AP (with intersecting sets of proto-
cols) in the responses to its directed and broadcast probes. When Linux clients
were used, so that association could be forced by the client STA, the AP would
typically respond with the association denied for an unknown reason.
Fig. 3. AP Association Response with mismatched protocols
However, a WEP client attempting to associate with the WRT54G AP set
for WPA2 (only), but with both TKIP and CCMP and the default WEP Key 0
set to match, revealed what appeared to be the AP offering the possibility of a
WEP connection:
Fig. 4. RSN Transmitter can support WEP simultaneously
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This was also noted in IEEE802.11i, verbatim:
“Bit 1: No Pairwise. If a STA can support WEP default key 0 simulta-
neously with a pairwise key.” [6, Para 7.3.2.25.3]
This looked promising for a attempt to get a WEP association with a WPA2
AP, to compromise the WEP key and thereby subvert the security of the under-
lying network.
3.3 A False Positive Result
As expected, the Windows clients initially were unable to associate, via WEP,
with the WRT54G configured for WPA2 “TKIP+AES” mode. However, at one
point, after a series of configuration changes, theMicrosoftWindows 2000 Pro-
fessional with D-Link “AirPlus G” DWL-G520 client indicated it had associated
with the LinksysWRT54G via WEP. A valid association was verified by pinging
a host behind the AP via the WLAN.
The next phase was to gather enough packets to execute the KoreK attacks
and recover the WEP key. Traffic was simulated with a continuous ping (one per
second) from the Windows 2000 host. Unfortunately, after a period of time, the
connection would fail and the drivers lock-up, requiring a reboot. This apparent
instability was severely hampering the gathering of packets for the statistical
attack and it was decided to switch to a Linux client with a more versatile set
of network tools and possibly less stability problems.
Two different Linux clients with different hardware and software were used.
One used the D-Link “AirPlus G+” DWL-G520+, with a Texas Instruments
ACX110 chipset and ndiswrapper and the D-Link Windows XP drivers —
chosen because of the same binary drivers as the Windows clients, so as to
differentiate any OS-specific issues.
The other used the D-Link “AirPlus G” DWL-G520, with an entirely dif-
ferent Atheros chipset and madwifi drivers and wpa supplicant. This com-
bination was chosen because the Atheros chipset is highly configurable, per-
forming much of its work in software and firmware, rather than dedicated hard-
ware. The madwifi drivers give an extensive interface to this chipset and the
wpa supplicant uses a detailed configuration file, allowing all settings to be
manipulated.
Extensive testing involving all possible configurations of the clients and the
WRT54G as WPA or WPA2 failed to obtain a WEP association. The only
recourse was to revert to the Windows client and gather the necessary packets
over a longer time. However, now the Windows client also refused to associate
via WEP. There now seemed only two possibilities, either:
– The original WEP associations had actually been with some other AP, al-
lowing WEP; or
– The original associations had not actually been WEP or the AP was allowing
WEP.
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3.4 Analysis
The packet capture files for the month in question were reviewed to find that
the client had been authenticating and associating with the correct AP, the
WRT54G, but even though the Windows client had consistently reported WEP
encryption in use, the traffic clearly showed a TKIP protocol selection and 4-way
handshake for a WPA connection and the apparent ‘instability’ was in fact due
to the WEP key being used for the group cipher and the disassociate in group
key time-out never recovering (because the client will not negotiate a new key)
and the new handshake timing out.
Fig. 5. Disassociate on Group Key Time-out
Fig. 6. Which then fails to negotiate a new Group Key
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Further investigation revealed the ‘No Pairwise’ bit only has meaning for
a client STA, to indicate to an AP as to whether or not it can support WEP
default key 0 simultaneously with a pairwise key. (So that the AP does not
attempt to have the STA install a pairwise key, over the top of WEP default key
0.) This bit has no relevance in packets from an AP. An AP always sets this bit
to zero. While this is not new, it was, for this author, obscure, and is included
for emphasis.
3.5 Remaining Results
With this avenue of attack failing to be realised, the tests were repeated on the
other APs.
None of the variations of clients, for either Atheros or Texas Instruments
chipsets, combined with either Microsoft or Linux driver software, on any
of the platforms, could successfully associate with WEP with any of the APs
surveyed, when correctly configured for WPA2 (only), all of the APs surveyed.
3.6 Weak Configurations
Neither the Linksys WRT54G, nor the Belkin “Wireless G Router” provided
a configuration option permitting the use of WEP with WPA modes.
The SMC SMC2804WBR “Barricade g Wireless Broadband Router” does
offer a WEP/WPA combined mode. With this mode set both WPA and WEP
associations can exist simultaneously.
The SMC2804WBR was configured for WEP/WPA combined mode and si-
multaneous associations were successfully made with:
– the D-Link “AirPlus G+” DWL-G520+ Wireless PCI Adapter (Texas Instru-
ments ACX110 chipset) on Microsoft Windows XP Professional with D-Link
“AirPlus G+” DWL-G520+ Windows XP drivers configured for WPA; and
– the D-Link “AirPlus G” DWL-G520 Wireless PCI Adapter (Atheros chipset) on
Fedora with madwifi drivers and wpa supplicant configured for WEP.
Both the WPA and WEP clients were able to access the network behind the
SMC2804WBR, confirmed by pinging hosts on the wired network.
By setting continuous traffic from the WEP client, it was a trivial matter
to capture the traffic needed to use with aircrack to recover the WEP key on
the separate “intruder” device, a laptop with a D-Link “AirPlus G” DWL-
G650 Wireless PCMCIA Adapter (Atheros chipset) on Fedora with madwifi
drivers, kismet, ethereal (now “Wireshark”) and aircrack.
It was found that the WEP key allowed an attacker to get to the entire
wired LAN behind the SMC2804WBR, severely compromising the wired LAN,
including access to every host NIC (although host security provided protection)
and by setting the SMC2804WBR as the default gateway, all other subnets and
the Internet service. This required the SMC2804WBR to be configured as a
gateway, allowing any out, with the appropriate default routes.
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Curiously, although the WEP key allowed an attacker to get to the entire
wired LAN, we were not able to access the WPA devices using the same AP for
the same wired LAN.
Again, this is not a clandestine attack — the SMC2804WBR has to be con-
figured as WEP/WPA to allow this attack. This is a clearly dangerous configu-
ration.
3.7 Using Pre-Shared Keys with WPA and WPA2
Note that in the simplest case, for small private networks, there is the option of
using a Pre-Shared Key (PSK) with WPA2 (WPA2-PSK). The Wi-Fi Alliance
calls this “WPA2-Personal” (as opposed to “WPA2-Enterprise” that uses the
802.1X authentication methods).
The remaining issue, which is also shown in the discussion in the next section,
was the use of ‘Pre-Shared Key’ (PSK) mode in all of these tests. It took air-
crack only eight seconds to find our reasonably long (19 characters and 20 char-
acters), but very poorly chosen pass-phrases, “acetylaminofluorene” and “acetyl-
cholinesterase” that were used for WPA and WPA2 key pass-phrases throughout
these tests.
Fig. 7. WPA2-PSK broken in 8 seconds
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4 Discussion
Some device drivers allow a PSK to be entered as 64 hexadecimal digits providing
the 256-bit key directly, such as (often with a leading ‘0x’)
‘8F8E17FC4CFD675A4F70E38587843845097A6D34637CA4F71FF785EBB462D71E’.
However, unless every device on the network allows this method of entry, it can
not be used for any of the devices, as the other entry methods hash the input.
The more universal method of setting the PSK is to supply a 8–634 character
pass-phrase. The IEEE 802.11i standard uses the term “pass-phrase”, meaning
a secret text string, to distinguish it from a ‘password’ commonly used to mean
a single group of alphabetic symbols containing no spaces. There is a very great
risk to the security of the configuration if the pass-phrase used has insufficient en-
tropy, making it susceptible to dictionary attacks. Ideally the pass-phrase should
be 63 random printable characters, such as
‘Fi+Kbl).1x@/X5Lf8sNf;AYl[!eCU:’y72aSBoB(=P4k=GzLna:F*bKJ?.gAwq@’.
However some vendor’s interfaces cannot accept the full encoding range of 32 to
126 (decimal), inclusive and the pass-phrase is restricted to alphanumeric char-
acters, such as
‘L7YavIR03qUQbrVWexMqDrGSK8gCxdjATZVSllFiTpPZUzSoPjrofrxokoV6cih’.
A common comment in Internet forums is that the pass-phrase should be
at least 20 characters long. However this should be random characters, or there
will be insufficient entropy. Many make the mistake of using an actual phrase,
or worse a single password. Figure 7 shows how quickly tools like aircrack can
break non-random words with a dictionary attack — in this case, eight seconds.
4.1 General Guidelines for Implementing a RSN
Since any implementation of a RSN on WPA2 equipment demands the use of
AES-CCMP only for both the (singular) pairwise suite, as well as the groupwise
suite, the following guidelines apply equally to public, private and commercial
WLANs:
1. All of the devices must implement CCMP (i.e. must all be WPA2 devices).
2. All of the devices must not permit pre-RSNAs:
– Select “WPA2 Only Mode”
– Ensure the transmitted RSN IE uses only CCMP for the groupwise suite
– Test to ensure WEP STA is refused association — in both restricted and
open authentication modes
3. If the software/firmware allows, remove or disable WEP-40, WEP-104 and
TKIP.
4. If using WPA2-PSK, use a random 256-bit (64 hexadecimal digit) key.
5. If using PSK, but cannot use hex keys, use a random 63 character ‘pass-
phrase’.
6. If using 802.1X authentication, ensure the selected EAP provides mutual
authentication, such as EAP-TLS.
7. If the software/firmware allows, remove or disable other EAPs.
4 To distinguish it from the 64 digit hex.
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4.2 Implications of ACSI 33 for Government WLANs
The Australian Government Information and Communications Technology Se-
curity Manual (ACSI 33) requires a significant jump in security beyond routine
commercial information security, even at the lowest levels.
ACSI 33 states that “wireless communications SHOULD NOT5 be used for
classified information”. This means both the National security and Non-national
security classification scales.
Thus, wireless communications can only be used for UNCLASSIFIED and
Public domain information. While Public domain information does not require
protection, the infrastructure itself will benefit from any protection provided.
UNCLASSIFIED information needs to be protected from the Public domain, so
some form of encryption needs to be employed.
RC4 is not a DSD Approved Cryptographic Algorithm (DACA), so WEP-40,
WEP-104 and TKIP are not appropriate. The Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) with any of 128, 192, or 256 bit keys, is a DACA, so AES-CCMP (i.e.
RSN), as described in the General Guidelines, Section 4.1, should be the only
mode used for any UNCLASSIFIED government wireless communications.
Note also that as wireless communications would typically fall under the
umbrella of remote access, strong mutual authentication is required. Again, the
use of an AES-CCMP RSN with IEEE802.1X and EAP-TLS authentication,
as described in Section 4.1, should be the only mode used for any government
UNCLASSIFIED WLANs.
ACSI 33 further states that “AgenciesMUST , where they have a requirement
to use wireless communications for the transmission of classified information, en-
sure that the information is protected by DSD Approved Cryptography...” There
are no DSD Approved Cryptographic Protocols (DACPs) for wireless communi-
cations, so any products will have to go through the Australasian Information
Security Evaluation Program or a Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
scheme.
5 Conclusion
There is a critical difference between RSNA-capable devices and RSNA-enabled
devices. We have shown that conforming with the IEEE802.11i amendment does
not necessarily enforce a RSN and the WPA2 certification of equipment is not
sufficient to provide a RSN, since compliance with IEEE802.11i does not man-
date a RSN in operation.
WPA2 certified equipment will implement a RSN, if properly configured to
do so, but this is unlikely to be the default. With WPA2 certification requiring
backward compatibility with WPA, it is more likely that WPA2 devices will
default to a TSN. In addition to this, many vendors provide various other mixed
pre-RSNA modes of operation.
5 To do otherwise MUST have detailed documentation, risk assessments, reviews, IT
Security Adviser input and management approval.
AusCERT2007 R&D Stream 66
This paper discussed the differences between WEP, IEEE802.11i, RSN, TSN,
WPA and WPA2, and their application in public, private, commercial and gov-
ernment environments. The insecurity of mixing WEP, WPA and WPA2 net-
works was demonstrated, with any mixed modes of operation only being as
secure as the weakest mode possible and reducing any potential RSN to a TSN.
However, no evidence was found, when properly configured, that any of the
consumer-grade devices could be subverted into associating in a weaker mode
than that configured. Finally, the insecurity of ‘Pre-Shared Key’ modes of oper-
ation with insufficient entropy was also demonstrated.
The paper provided guidance in the secure deployment of WPA2 to form a
RSN. Cryptographic protection of the link layer with WPA2 devices can only
be provisioned by the ‘WPA2 Only Mode’ of operation, which being based on
AES-CCMP uses a DACA and EAP-TLS was identified as a suitable protocol for
the mutual authentication and key requirements for RSN deployment specified
by IEEE802.11i and ACSI 33.
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A Glossary of Acronyms
The following acronyms and abbreviations were used in this document in the
context as defined herein.
AES — (NIST) Advanced Encryption Standard (FIPS 197)
AES-CCMP — AES in CCM Protocol
AP — (wireless network) Access Point
AS — Authentication Server
BSS — Basic Service Set
BSSID — Basic Service Set IDentification
CBC — Cipher-Block Chaining
CBC-MAC — Cipher-Block Chaining with Message Authentication Code
CCA — Clear Channel Assessment
CCM — CTR with CBC-MAC
CCMP — (AES in) CTR with CBC-MAC Protocol
CDMA — Code Division Multiple Access
COTS — Commercial Off-The-Shelf (items/software/equipment)
CRC — Cyclic Redundancy Code
CS — Carrier Sense
CTR — CounTeR mode (of use of a cipher)
CTS — Clear To Send
DoS — Denial of Service
DS — Distribution System (used to interconnect a set of BSSs and integrated
LANs to create an ESS)
DSS — Distribution System Service
DSD — Defence Signals Directorate (Australian Department of Defence)
DSSS — Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
EAP — Extensible Authentication Protocol (IETF RFC 3748)
EAPOL — Extensible Authentication Protocol over LANs (IEEE P802.1X-
REV)
EMR — ElectroMagnetic Radiation
ESS — Extended Service Set
FHSS — Frequency-Hopping Spread Spectrum
FIPS — (USA) Federal Information Processing Standard
GMK — Group Master Key
GTK — Group Temporal Key
GTKSA — Group Temporal Key Security Association
IBSS — Independent Basic Service Set
ICV — Integrity Check Value
IEEE — Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
ISI — Information Security Institute (at QUT, formerly ISRC)
ISM — Industrial, Scientific, and medical
ISO — International Organisation for Standardisation (not an acronym)
IV — Initialisation Vector
KCK — EAPOL-Key Confirmation Key
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KEK — EAPOL-Key Encryption Key
LIPD — (Australian) Low Interference Potential Devices (Class Licence)
MAC —Medium Access Control (address/sublayer) or Message Authentication
Code
MIC — Message Integrity Code
MIMO — Multiple Input Multiple Output
N/A — Not Applicable
NIST — (USA) National Institute of Standards and Technology
OFDM — Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing
PDU — Protocol Data Unit
PHY — PHYsical (layer)
PMK — Pairwise Master Key
PMKID — Pairwise Master Key IDentifier
PMKSA — Pairwise Master Key Security Association
PSK — PreShared Key
PTK — Pairwise Transient Key
PTKSA — Pairwise Transient Key Security Association
QoS — Quality of Service
QUT — Queensland University of Technology (Australia)
RADIUS — Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (IETF RFC 2865)
RF — Radio Frequency (EMR)
RSN — Robust Security Network
RSNA — Robust Security Network Association
RTS — Request to Send
SOHO — Small Office / Home Office
SSID — (IEEE 802.11) Service Set IDentifier
STA — STAtion — any device that contains an IEEE 802.11 conformant MAC
and PHY interface to the WM
TKIP — Temporal Key Integrity Protocol
TSN — Transition Security Network
WEP — Wired Equivalent Privacy
WEP-40 — WEP using a 40-bit key (64-bit6 WEP)
WEP-104 — WEP using a 104-bit key (128-bit7 WEP)
Wi-Fi — (IEEE 802.11 series technologies, certified by the) Wireless Fidelity
(Alliance)
WLAN — Wireless LAN
WM — Wireless Medium
WPA —Wi-Fi Protected Access (certification by the Wi-Fi Alliance, for a TSN)
WPA2 — Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (certification by the Wi-Fi Alliance, for a
RSN)
6 Some vendors refer to WEP-40 as 64-bit WEP (including 24 bits of IV).
7 Some vendors refer to WEP-104 as 128-bit WEP (including 24 bits of IV).
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